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ABSTRACT
In this paper I argue that we can learn much about ‘wild justice’ and the evolutionary origins of social
morality – behaving fairly – by studying social play behavior in group-living animals, and that
interdisciplinary cooperation will help immensely. In our efforts to learn more about the evolution of
morality we need to broaden our comparative research to include animals other than non-human
primates. If one is a good Darwinian, it is premature to claim that only humans can be empathic and
moral beings. By asking the question ‘What is it like to be another animal?’ we can discover rules of
engagement that guide animals in their social encounters. When I study dogs, for example, I try to be a
‘dogocentrist’ and practice ‘dogomorphism.’ My major arguments center on the following ‘big’ questions:
Can animals be moral beings or do they merely act as if they are? What are the evolutionary roots of
cooperation, fairness, trust, forgiveness, and morality? What do animals do when they engage in social
play? How do animals negotiate agreements to cooperate, to forgive, to behave fairly, to develop trust?
Can animals forgive? Why cooperate and play fairly? Why did play evolve as it has? Does ‘being fair’
mean being more fit – do individual variations in play influence an individual’s reproductive fitness, are
more virtuous individuals more fit than less virtuous individuals? What is the taxonomic distribution of
cognitive skills and emotional capacities necessary for individuals to be able to behave fairly, to
empathize, to behave morally? Can we use information about moral behavior in animals to help us
understand ourselves? I conclude that there is strong selection for cooperative fair play in which
individuals establish and maintain a social contract to play because there are mutual benefits when
individuals adopt this strategy and group stability may be also be fostered. Numerous mechanisms have
evolved to facilitate the initiation and maintenance of social play to keep others engaged, so that agreeing
to play fairly and the resulting benefits of doing so can be readily achieved. I also claim that the ability to
make accurate predictions about what an individual is likely to do in a given social situation is a useful
litmus test for explaining what might be happening in an individual’s brain during social encounters, and
that intentional or representational explanations are often important for making these predictions.

Wild justice: social morality, manners, and cooperation in animals
Those communities which included the greatest number of the most sympathetic
members would flourish best and rear the greatest number of offspring. (Charles Darwin
1871/1936, p. 163)

I believe that at the most fundamental level our nature is compassionate, and that
cooperation, not conflict, lies at the heart of the basic principles that govern our human
existence…By living a way of life that expresses our basic goodness, we fulfill our
humanity and give our actions dignity, worth, and meaning. (His Holiness The Dalai Lama
2002, p. 68)
Different as they are from language-using human beings, they are able to form
relationships not only with members of their own species, but also with human beings,
while giving expression to their own intentions and purposes. So that the relationships
are far more clearly analogous to human relationships than some of the philosophical
theorizing that I have discussed would allow. Some human beings indeed and some
nonhuman animals pursue their respective goods in company with and in cooperation
with each other. And what we mean by ‘goods’ in saying this is precisely the same,
whether we are speaking of human or dolphin or gorilla. (Macintyre 1999, p. 61)
Now he worships at an altar of a stagnant pool; And when he sees his reflection, he’s
fulfilled; Oh, man is opposed to fair play; He wants it all and he wants it his way. (Bob
Dylan 1983).
The behavior of non-human animal beings (‘animals’) fascinates people of all ages and of all cultures.
People around the world are interested in what animals do, either because they are interested in the
animals themselves or because they want to know more about the origins of human behavior. There also
is much interdisciplinary interest in questions about animal behavior – what available data mean, what
methods are the best for answering questions that are frequently at once important, challenging and
frustrating, and what role do representatives of each discipline play in helping us to gain a better
understanding of the behavior of our non-human kin. Interdisciplinary discourse is essential. I also want to
stress that all sorts of information including anecdotes, intuitions, philosophical musings, and ‘hard’ data,
are important as we try to understand ‘wild justice’ and the origins of moral behavior (Allen, this volume,
argues that there are many levels of abstraction that inform explanations of animal behavior). ‘Real world’
examples – data from careful studies of animal behavior – are critical for furthering our understanding.
Anecdotes, intuitions, and philosophical musings along with empirical data all drive further empirical
research. I also want to emphasize the importance of adopting a broad comparative approach to the
study of animal behavior and for coming to terms with what available information has to say about the
cognitive abilities of other animals in the context of what we know about them in terms of their own
evolutionary and natural histories.
Of course some people want to learn more about animals to make the case for human uniqueness,
usually claiming that humans are ‘above’ and ‘better’ than other animals. But the more we study animals
and the more we learn about ‘them’ and ‘us’ we frequently discover there is not a real dichotomy or nonnegotiable gap between animals and humans because humans are, of course, animals. There is
evolutionary continuity. Art, culture, language, and tool use and manufacture can no longer be used to
separate ‘them’ from ‘us’ (but perhaps cooking food is uniquely human; Wrangham and Conklin-Brittain
2003). Line-drawing can be very misleading especially when people take the view that non-human
animals are ‘lower’ or ‘less valuable’ than ‘higher’ animals, where ‘higher’ means human. In many ways
‘we are them’ and ‘they are us’ (Bekoff 2002a).
Darwin (1859, 1872/1998) emphasized that there is evolutionary continuity among different species. His
ideas about evolutionary continuity, that behavioral, cognitive, emotional, and moral variations among
different species are differences in degree rather than differences in kind, are often invoked in trying to
answer questions about the evolution of various behavioral phenotypes. On this view there are shades of

gray among different animals and between nonhumans and humans, that the differences are not black
and white with no transitional stages or inexplicable jumps (Gruen 2002; Güzeldere and Nahmias 2002;
see also many other essays in Bekoff et al. 2002). Current work in evolutionary biology and anthropology
suggests that linear scales of evolution in which there are large gaps between humans and at least some
animals are simplistic views of the evolutionary process.
There is no doubt that we can learn much about humans by carefully studying our animal kin and also by
listening to their stories. One reason I find the study of animal behavior, and in particular questions
centering on animal cognition, animal emotions, and animal morality to be so fascinating, exciting, and
also frustrating and challenging, is because I want to learn more about why both the similarities and
differences have evolved.
One area that will surely benefit from a meeting of interdisciplinary minds concerns the evolution of social
morality and the negotiation and maintenance of cooperation, fairness, kindness, generosity, trust,
respect, and social norms. Researchers from many disciplines have debated the evolutionary origins of
social morality, asking if some animals have codes of social conduct that regulate their behavior in terms
of what is permissible and what is not permissible during social encounters (for wide ranging discussion
see Kropotkin 1902; Solomon 1995; de Waal 1996, 2001; Hurd 1996; Ridley 1996, 2001; Mitchell 1998;
Macintyre 1999; Sober and Wilson 1998, 2000; Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 7, No. 1/2,
2000; Field 2001; Hinde 2002; Jamieson 2002; Wilson 2002; de Waal and Tyack 2003). These scientists
and philosophers want to know what are the moral capacities of animals, can they be moral agents with a
moral sense who are able to live in moral communities? In a recent issue of the Journal of Consciousness
Studies (Volume 7, No. 1/2, 2000) researchers from many disciplines debated the evolutionary origins of
morality. These scholars were interested in discussing animal roots on which human morality might be
built, even if human morality is not identical to animal morality, which it likely is not.
Recently there also has been a resurgence of interest in the notion of fairness and altruism in humans
(Sober and Wilson 1998, 2000; Douglas 2001; Riolo et al. 2001; Sigmund and Nowak 2001; Bowles and
Gintis 2002; Fehr and Gächter 2002; Jamieson 2002; Sigmund et al. 2002; Bewley 2003; Fehr and
Rockenbach 2003). Researchers are interested in learning about how individuals from different cultures
share resources, and if they share them equitably even if they are not compelled to do so. Despite Bob
Dylan’s lament (above) much research shows that human beings are more generous and more fair than
game-theory and other models predict. There seems to be a set of core values that are learned through
social interactions with others, and these values influence moral decisions. There also is evidence that
people will punish free-riders in the absence of personal gain, and that cooperation is sustained by such
‘altruistic punishment’ (Bowles and Gintis 2002; Fehr and Gächter 2002). Taken together, cross-cultural
data suggest that there may be an innate drive to be fair. Of course, much more comparative work still
needs to be done.
But what about animals? Can there be ‘wild justice?’ Is ‘being fair, nice, and moral’ doing what comes
naturally? I will return to these questions below. Charles Darwin argued this case and also considered the
development and the intellectual and moral faculties that are important in cooperative social encounters.
Many animals live in fairly stable social groups that resemble those of ancestral humans. There are
divisions of labor, food sharing, communal care of young, and inter- and intrasexual dominance
hierarchies. Many animals, especially mammals, also share with humans neuroanatomical structures in
the amygdala and hypothalamus and neurochemicals (dopamine, serotonin, oxytocin) that form the
neural bases for the expression and experience of emotions and empathy (Panksepp 1998; Preston and
de Waal 2002). A wide variety of social behavior patterns in animals have also been influenced by living
in groups of various sizes. If one is a good Darwinian and believes in evolutionary continuity, it seems

premature to claim that only humans can be empathic and moral beings. As we increasingly come to
recognize that animals share their emotions with us it becomes increasingly difficult to deny their
existence.
Social play: a foundation of fairness
In this essay I consider various aspects of the evolution of cooperation and fairness using social play
behavior in animals, especially mammals, as my exemplar of an activity in which one would expect to see
on-going negotiations of cooperation and agreements to behave fairly because the social dynamics of
play require that players agree to play and not to fight or to mate with one another. I am specifically
concerned with the notion of ‘behaving fairly.’ I touch on many topics that are considered elsewhere in
this volume, including what is cognitive ethology, anthropomorphism, the importance of broadening our
taxonomic horizons in studies of animal cognition beyond non-human primates, levels of selection, and
the role that anecdotes, intuitions, and common sense play in doing ‘hard’ science, and generating data
that may be called ‘science sense’ (Bekoff 2002a).
By ‘behaving fairly’ I use as a working guide the notion that animals often have social expectations when
they engage in various sorts of social encounters the violation of which constitutes being treated unfairly.
By studying the details and dynamics of social play behavior one can test some of these ideas. Also tied
into the notion of expectation is the element of surprise. Often, animals seem surprised by what happens
to them in a given social interaction. For example, a dog or wolf may cock her head from side-to-side and
squint, as if she is wondering what went ‘wrong’ when a play-mate becomes too assertive or too
aggressive. Perhaps they feel indignant when they are wronged, when their expectations or sense of
justice is violated, when they feel they are not being treated ‘right.’
I will conclude that social play is a ‘foundation of fairness.’ I argue that it is through social cooperation that
groups (communities) are built from individuals agreeing to work in harmony with other individuals.
Further, based on recent research on the neurobiology of human cooperation, I argue that ‘being fair’ may
feel good for animals as well. Lastly, I stress that in our efforts to learn more about the evolution of social
morality we need to broaden our comparative research to include animals other than non-human
primates.
The science of cognitive ethology: naturalizing the study of animal minds
There are two kind of biologists: those who are looking to see if there is one thing that
can be understood, and those who keep saying it is very complicated and nothing can be
understood. (Pigliucci 2002, p. 92)
Colin Allen (this volume) wants to know ‘Is anyone a cognitive ethologist?’ I think I am but I will let you
decide after you read his essay in this volume. Basically, the interdisciplinary science of cognitive
ethology is concerned with claims about the evolution of cognitive processes. Since behavioral abilities
have evolved in response to natural selection pressures, ethologists favor observations and experiments
on animals in conditions that are as close as possible to the natural environment where selection
occurred. Often a double-standard is used to criticize cognitive ethology for being too ‘soft.’ For example,
levels of statistical significance and data bases that are acceptable in other branches of science are not
accepted in cognitive ethological studies (Griffin 2001; Bekoff 2002a). Why is this so? Reasons offered
include lack of control of observations and experiments and also the fact that mental experiences are
private affairs and hypotheses about mental experiences are not falsifiable. I have little to say about this
other than that it is clear that cognitive ethology is a field of science, that we have the tools to learn much
about mental processes and mental states in animals, and that falsifiable hypotheses can be offered and

tested (Allen and Bekoff 1997; Griffin 2001; Bekoff 2002a; Bekoff Allen and Burghardt 2002). We also
now really do now know quite a lot about animal minds (Hauser 2000; Griffin 2001; Bekoff 2002a; essays
in (Bekoff, Allen and Burghardt 2002). Skeptics need to offer more motivated reasons for bashing
cognitive ethology. (It is important to note that the atmosphere at the meeting at which the papers in this
volume were presented was very pro-animal cognition. Nonetheless, critical and skeptical questions were
asked but the discussion did not get bogged down nor was it deflected by an insistence that the lack of
absolute certainty means that no or little progress can be made on the questions at hand. I will return to
this topic later on in my brief discussion of the notion of prediction.)
No longer constrained by psychological behaviorism, cognitive ethologists are interested in comparing
thought processes, consciousness, beliefs, and rationality in animals. In addition to situating the study of
animal cognition in a comparative and evolutionary framework, cognitive ethologists also argue that field
studies of animals that include careful observation and experimentation can inform studies of animal
cognition, and that cognitive ethology will not have to be brought into the laboratory to make it respectable
(Allen and Bekoff 1997). Furthermore, because cognitive ethology is a comparative science, cognitive
ethological studies emphasize broad taxonomic comparisons and do not focus on a few select
representatives of limited taxa. Cognitive psychologists, in contrast to cognitive ethologists, usually work
on related topics in laboratory settings, and do not emphasize comparative or evolutionary aspects of
animal cognition. When cognitive psychologists do make cross-species comparisons, they are typically
interested in explaining different behavior patterns in terms of common underlying mechanisms.
Ethologists, in common with other biologists, are often more concerned with the diversity of solutions that
living organisms have found for common problems.
Many different types of research fall under the term ‘cognitive ethology’ and it is pointless to try to delimit
the boundaries of cognitive ethology; because of the enormous amount of interdisciplinary interest in the
area, narrow definitions of cognitive ethology are likely to become rapidly obsolete. There also seems to
be little difference between methods used to study animal cognition and those used to study other
aspects of animal behavior. Differences lie not so much in what is done and how it is done, but rather how
data are explained. Colin Allen and I, in our book, Species of mind: The Philosophy and biology of
cognitive ethology (1997), have argued that the main distinction between cognitive ethology and classical
ethology lies not in the types of data collected, but in the understanding of the conceptual resources that
are appropriate for explaining those data.
Classical ethology and cognitive ethology: what is it like to be a ____?
Nobel Laureate Niko Tinbergen (1963) identified four overlapping areas with which ethological
investigations should be concerned, namely, evolution (phylogeny), adaptation (function), causation, and
development (ontogeny). Tinbergen’s framework is also useful for those interested in animal cognition
(Jamieson and Bekoff 1993; Allen and Bekoff 1997; Smuts 2001). Burghardt (1997) suggested adding a
fifth area, private experience. He (p. 276) noted that ‘The fifth aim is nothing less than a deliberate
attempt to understand the private experience, including the perceptual world and mental states, of other
organisms. The term private experience is advanced as a preferred label that is most inclusive of the full
range of phenomena that have been identified without prejudging any particular theoretical or
methodological approach.’
Burghardt’s suggestion invites what he calls ‘critical anthropomorphism,’ carefully used
anthropomorphism, an approach with which many agree. I have suggested that we be ‘biocentrically
anthropomorphic’ and that by doing so we do not necessarily lose the animal’s point of view. We are
humans and we have by necessity a human view of the world (Bekoff 2000b; see also Keeley’s and
Allen’s essays in this volume).

The way we describe and explain the behavior of other animals is influenced and limited by the language
we use to talk about things in general. By engaging in anthropomorphism we make the world of other
animals accessible to ourselves and to other human beings. By being anthropomorphic we can more
readily understand and explain the emotions or feelings of other animals. But this is not to say that other
animals are happy or sad in the same ways in which humans (or even other members of the same
species) are happy or sad. Of course, I cannot be absolutely certain that my late dog, Jethro, was happy,
sad, angry, upset, or in love, but these words serve to explain what he might have been feeling. Merely
referring to the firing of different neurons or to the activity of different muscles in the absence of
behavioral information and context is insufficiently informative because we do not know about the specific
situation in which the animal finds herself.
Being a dog-o-centrist
My research and that of others begins with the question ‘What is it like to be a specific animal?’ So, when
I study dogs, for example, I try to be a dog-o-centrist and practice dogomorphism. Thus, when I claim that
a dog is happy, for example when playing, I am saying it is dog-joy, and that dog-joy may be different
from chimpanzee-joy. While I will not go into it any further, this is a very important stance for it stresses
that there are important species and individual differences in behavior, cognitive capacities, and
emotions, and that it is wrong and simplistic to claim that if animal joy is not like our joy then they do not
have it.
What it basically comes down to is that as humans studying other animals, we cannot totally lose our
anthropocentric perspective. But we can try as hard as possible to combine the animals’ viewpoints to the
ways in which we study, describe, interpret, and explain their behavior.
The evolution of social morality: continuity, proto-morality, and questions of human uniqueness
Evolutionary reconstructions of social behavior often depend on educated guesses (some better than
others) about the past social (and other) environments in which ancestral beings lived. In the same sense
that other’s minds are private, so is evolution (Bekoff 2002a). Often it is difficult to know with a great deal
of certainty very much about these variables and how they may have figured into evolutionary scenarios.
It is an understatement to note that is extremely difficult to study the evolution of morality in any animal
species, and the very notion of animal morality itself often makes for heated discussions. Bernstein
(2000) claims that ‘morality in animals might lie outside of the realm of measurement techniques available
to science’ (p. 34). Nonetheless, it seems clear that detailed comparative analyses of social behavior in
animals can indeed provide insights into the evolution of social morality. Certainly, these sorts of studies
are extremely challenging, but the knowledge gained is essential in our efforts to learn more about the
evolution of sociality and social morality and to learn more about human nature and perhaps human
uniqueness.
Many discussions of the evolution of morality center on the development of various sorts of models (e.g.
Axelrod 1984; Ridley 1996, 2001; Skyrms 1996; Dugatkin 1997; Sober and Wilson 1998, 2000; essays in
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2000, volume 7, No. 1/2).While these models are very useful for
stimulating discussion and further research, they do not substitute for available data (however few) that
may bear on animal morality (see, for example, some essays in Aureli and de Waal (2000) for additional
comparative information and also Dugatkin and Bekoff (2003).
The study of the evolution of morality, specifically cooperation and fairness, is closely linked to science,
religion, theology, spirituality and perhaps even different notions of God, in that ideas about continuity and
discontinuity (the possible uniqueness of humans and other species), individuality, and freedom need to

be considered in detail. Furthermore, it is important to discuss relationships among science, religion, and
God because spirituality and the notion of one form of God or another had strong influences on the
evolution of our ancestors, their cognitive, emotional, and moral lives.
Peterson (2000; see also Peterson 1999) has discussed the evolutionary roots of morality (stages that he
refers to as ‘quasi-morality’ and ‘proto-morality’ in animals) and religion in relation to the roles played by
cognition and culture. He also stresses the importance of recognizing continuities and discontinuities with
other animals, arguing ultimately (and speciesistically) that while some animals might possess protomorality (they are able ‘to rationally deliberate actions and their consequences’, p. 475) none other than
humans is ‘genuinely moral’ because to be able to be genuinely moral requires higher emergent levels of
cognition as well as culture and the world view that culture provides, namely, religion. Peterson (2000, p.
478) claims that ‘Quasi-moral and protomoral systems do not require a global framework that guides
decision making. They are always proximate and pragmatic. In these systems, there is no long-term goal
or ideal state to be achieved. Yet, genuine morality is virtually inconceivable without such conceptions.’
Peterson also claims that any sociobiological account (based on selfishness or combativeness) of human
morality is incomplete. I agree and also argue that this is so for some non-human animals as well. When
animals are studied in their own worlds they may indeed have their own form of genuine morality, there
might indeed be long-term goals and ideal states to be achieved. Our anthropocentric view of other
animals, in which humans are so taken with themselves, is far too narrow. The worlds and lives of other
animals are not identical to those of humans and may vary from species-to-species and even within
species. The same problems arise in the study of emotions (Bekoff 2000a, 2002a, 2004) if we believe that
emotions in animals are going to be identical to or even recognizably similar among different species.
There is also variability among humans in what some might view as long-term goals and ideal states, and
it would be premature to conclude that there is one set of long-term goals and ideal states that
characterize, or are essential to, the capacity to be genuinely moral. To cash out stages of moral
evolution as does Peterson, it looks like quasi-morality and proto-morality are less than genuine morality.
Cooperation and fairness are not by-products of aggression and selfishness
…my thesis is that justice is first of all a natural sentiment, an inborn sense of our
connectedness with others and our shared interests and concerns. (Solomon 1995, p.
153)
My arguments center on the view that cooperation is not merely always a byproduct of tempering
aggressive and selfish tendencies (combating Richard Dawkins’ (1976) selfish genes) and attempts at
reconciliation. Rather, cooperation and fairness can evolve on their own because they are important in
the formation and maintenance of social relationships (Solomon 1995 also forcefully argues this point).
This view contrasts with those who see aggression, cheating, selfishness, and perhaps amorality as
driving the evolution of sociality, fairness, and justice. The combative Hobbesian world in which
individuals are constantly at one another’s throat is not the natural state of affairs. Nature is not always
red in tooth and claw,. Dawkins (2001) himself has been quoted as saying ‘A pretty good definition of the
kind of society in which I don’t want to live is a society founded on the principles of Darwinism.’
Does it feel good to be fair?
It will be only after we have established the facts of mutual aid in different classes of
animals and their importance for evolution, that we shall be able to study what belongs in
the evolution of sociable feelings, to parental feelings, and what to sociability
proper…Mutual Aid [is] an argument in favor of a pre-human origin of moral instincts, but

also as a law of Nature and a factor of evolution. (Petr Kropotkin 1902, pp. x–xii) Justice
begins with our emotional engagement in the world, not in philosophical detachment or in
any merely hypothetical situation. (Solomon 1995, 199)
Studies of the evolution of social morality need to pay close attention to the rich cognitive, intellectual, and
deep emotional lives of animals (Bekoff 2000a,b, 2002a,b) and how these capacities figure into moral
sensibility and the ability to make moral judgments. Truth be told, we really do not know much about
these capacities even in our primate relatives despite claims that we do (Bekoff 2002c, 2003a, 2005). We
know that animals and humans share many of the same emotions and same chemicals that play a role in
the experience and expressions of emotions such as joy and pleasure. If being nice feels good then that
is a good reason for being nice. It is also a good reason for a pattern of behavior to evolve and to remain
in an animal’s arsenal.
Are some animals capable of the emotions and empathy that might underlie morality? We know that in
humans the amygdala and hypothalamus are important in emotional experiences and that they are
mediated by neurotransmitters such as dopamine, serotonin and oxytocin. We also know that many
animals, especially mammals, share with humans the same neurological structures and chemicals
(Panksepp 1998; Bekoff 2002a). Of course, this does not necessarily mean animals share our feelings,
but careful observation of individuals during social encounters suggests that at least some of them do.
While their feelings are not necessarily identical to ours this is of little or no concern because it is unlikely
that they should be the same as ours.
Empathy is also important to consider. Preston and de Waal (2002) argue that empathy is more
widespread among animals than has previously been recognized (see also Kuczaj et al. 2001). In a
classic study, Wechlin et al. (1964) showed that a hungry rhesus monkey would not take food if doing so
subjected another monkey to an electric shock. In similar situations rats will also restrain themselves
when they know their actions would cause pain to another individual (Church 1959). In another study,
Diana monkeys were trained to insert a token into a slot to obtain food (Markowitz 1982). A male was
observed helping the oldest female who had failed to learn the task. On three occasions he picked up the
tokens she had dropped, put them into the machine, and allowed her to have the food. His behavior
seemed to have no benefits for him at all; there did not seem to be any hidden agenda.
Along these lines, de Waal observed Kuni, a captive female bonobo, capture a starling and take the bird
outside and place it on its feet (Preston and de Waal 2002). When the bird did not move Kuni tossed it in
the air. When the starling did not fly Kuni took it to the highest point in her enclosure, carefully unfolded its
wings and threw it in the air. The starling still did not fly and Kuni then guarded and protected it from a
curious juvenile.
Elephants also may show concern for others. Poole (1998), who has studied African elephants for
decades, was told a story about a teenage female who was suffering from a withered leg on which she
could put no weight. When a young male from another group began attacking the injured female, a large
adult female chased the attacking male, returned to the young female, and touched her crippled leg with
her trunk. Poole argues that the adult female was showing empathy and sympathy.
While good stories alone are not enough to make a compelling argument, when there are many such
anecdotes they can be used to provide a solid basis for further detailed empirical research. Ignoring them
is to ignore a rich data base. I have argued elsewhere that ‘the plural of anecdote is data’ (Bekoff 2002a).
We will probably never know whether these rats, monkeys, and elephants were feeling empathy as we
do. But there are ways in which we can begin comparing what is going on in animal brains to what

happens in our own. Neuroimaging techniques are shedding new light on human emotions, and it likely
will not be long before we begin doing similar studies with other animals.
It is important to consider the possibility that it feels good to be fair to others, to cooperate with them and
to treat them fairly, to forgive them for their mistakes and shortcomings. Recent neural imaging research
on humans by Rilling and his colleagues (Rilling et al. 2002) has shown that the brain’s pleasure centers
are strongly activated when people cooperate with one another, that we might be wired to be fair or nice
to one another. (I do not want to argue here that ‘being fair’ always means ‘being nice.’) This is extremely
significant research for it posits that there is a strong neural basis for human cooperation and that it feels
good to cooperate, that being nice is rewarding in social interactions and might be a stimulus for fostering
cooperation and fairness. Despite challenging technical difficulties, this sort of non-invasive research is
just what is needed on other animals.
Animal play and social contracts: Lessons in cooperation, justice, fairness, and trust
What is justice? Justice is fairness, so they say. But, what is fair? (Bradie 1999, p. 607)
Happiness is never better exhibited than by young animals, such as puppies, kittens, lambs, & c., when
playing together, like our own children. So wrote Charles Darwin in The Descent of Man and Selection in
Relation to Sex (Darwin 1871/1936, p. 448).
Animal play is obvious and few if any people would argue that play is not an important category of
behavior (for definitions of social play see Bekoff and Byers 1981, 1998; Fagen 1981; Power 2000;
Burghardt 2005). Animal social morality, however, is a more slippery concept. Cognitive ethological
approaches are useful for gaining an understanding of social play for various reasons including (Allen and
Bekoff 1997): (1) it exemplifies many of the theoretical issues faced by cognitive ethologists; (2) empirical
research on social play has and will benefit from a cognitive approach, because play involves
communication, intention, role-playing, and cooperation; (3) detailed analyses of social play may provide
more promising evidence of animal minds than research in many other areas, for it may yield clues about
the ability of animals to understand one another’s intentions; and (4) play occurs in a wide range of
mammalian species and in a number of avian species, and thus it affords the opportunity for a
comparative investigation of cognitive abilities extending beyond the narrow focus on primates that often
dominates discussions of nonhuman cognition. For example, during social play, many animals engage in
self-handicapping and role-reversals, two behavior patterns that are often used to make inferences about
intentionality (and consciousness and self-consciousness).
Social play in animals is an exhilarating activity in which to engage and to observe. The rhythm, dance,
and spirit of animals at play is incredibly contagious. Not only do their animal friends want to join in or find
others with whom to romp, but I also want to play when I see animals chasing one another, playing hideand-seek, and wresting with reckless abandon. My body once tingled with delight as I watched a young
elk in Rocky Mountain National Park, Colorado, running across a snow field, jumping in the air and
twisting his body while in flight, stopping to catch his breath, and then jumping and twisting over and over
and again. There was plenty of grassy terrain around but he chose the more challenging snow field in
which to romp (supporting Byers’ (1977, 1998) idea that play may be very important in physical training).
Buffaloes will also follow one another and playfully run onto and slide across ice, excitedly bellowing
‘Gwaaa’ as they do so. And, of course, we all know that dogs and cats love to play, as do many other
mammals. I and many others have observed birds also playfully soar across the sky chasing, diving here
and there, and frolicking with one another.

Consider also some of my field notes of two dogs at play:
Jethro bounds towards Zeke, stops immediately in front of him, crouches on his
forelimbs, wags his tail, barks, and immediately lunges at him, bites his scruff and shakes
his head rapidly from side-to-side, works his way around to his backside and mounts him,
jumps off, does a rapid bow, lunges at his side and slams him with his hips, leaps up and
bites his neck, and runs away. Zeke takes wild pursuit of Jethro and leaps on his back
and bites his muzzle and then his scruff, and shakes his head rapidly from side-to-side.
Suki bounds in and chases Jethro and Zeke and they all wrestle with one another. They
part for a few minutes. sniffing here and there and resting. Then, Jethro walks slowly over
to Zeke, extends his paw toward Zeke’s head, and nips at his ears. Zeke gets up and
jumps on Jethro’s back, bites him, and grasps him around his waist. They then fall to the
ground and mouth wrestle. Then they chase one another and roll over and play. Suki
decides to jump in and the three of them frolic until they’re exhausted. Never did their
play escalate into aggression.
The unmistakable emotions associated with play – joy and happiness – drive animals into becoming at
one with the activity. One way to get animals (including humans) to do something is to make it fun, and
there is no doubt that animals enjoy playing. Studies of the chemistry of play support the claim that play is
fun. Dopamine (and perhaps serotonin and norepinephrine) are important in the regulation of play. Rats
show an increase in dopamine activity when anticipating the opportunity to play (Siviy 1998) and enjoy
being playfully tickled (Panksepp 1998; 2000). There is also a close association between opiates and play
(Panksepp 1998).
Neurobiological data are essential for learning more about whether play truly is a subjectively pleasurable
activity for animals as it seems to be for humans. Siviy’s and Panksepp’s findings suggest that it is. In
light of these neurobiological (‘hard’) data concerning possible neurochemical bases for various moods, in
this case joy and pleasure, skeptics who claim that animals do not feel emotions might be more likely to
accept the idea that enjoyment could well be a motivator for play behavior.
It begins with a ‘bow’: ‘I want to play with you’
To learn about the dynamics of play it is essential to pay attention to subtle details that are otherwise lost
in superficial analyses. During play there are continuous rapid exchanges of information ‘on the run.’
Dogs and other animals keep track of what is happening when they play so we also need to pay attention
to details. My studies of play are based on careful observation and analyses – some might say obsessive
analyses – of video-tape. I watch tapes of play one frame at a time to see what the animals are doing and
how they exchange information about their intentions and desires to play. This is tedious work and some
of my students who were excited about studying dog play had second thoughts after watching the same
video frames over and over again. But when they then were able to go out and watch dogs play and
understand what was happening they came to appreciate that while studying play can be hard work it’s
well-worth the effort.
So, a typical scene might go as follows. ‘Would you care to play’ asks one wolf of another? ‘Yes, I would’
says the other. After each individual agrees to play and not to fight, prey on, or mate with the other, there
are on-going rapid and subtle exchanges of information so that their cooperative agreement can be finetuned and negotiated on the run, so that the activity remains playful. Incorporated into many explanations
of social play are such notions as making a deal, trusting, behaving fairly, forgiving, apologizing, and
perhaps justice, behavioral attributes that underlie social morality and moral agency (Bekoff 2002a).

Recent research by Okamoto and Matsumara (2001) suggests that punishment and apology play a role in
maintaining cooperation between individual non-human primates.
When individuals play they typically use action patterns that are also used in other contexts, such as
predatory behavior, antipredatory behavior, and mating activities. Behavior patterns that are observed in
mating may be intermixed in flexible kaleidoscopic sequences with actions that are used during fighting,
looking for prey, and avoiding being eaten. These actions may not vary much across different contexts, or
they may be hard to discriminate even for the participants. So, how do animals know that they are
playing? How do they communicate their desires or intentions to play or to continue to play? How is the
play mood maintained?
Because there is a chance that various behavior patterns that are performed during on-going social play
can be misinterpreted, individuals need to tell others ‘I want to play,’ ‘this is still play no matter what I am
going to do to you,’ or ‘this is still play regardless of what I just did to you.’ An agreement to play, rather
than to fight, mate, or engage in predatory activities, can be negotiated in various ways. Individuals may
use various behavior patterns – play markers – to initiate play or to maintain (prevent termination of) a
play mood (Bekoff 1975, 1977a, 1995; Bekoff and Allen 1992, 1998; Allen and Bekoff 1997; lack,
Jeannotte, and de Waal 2004) by punctuating play sequences with these actions when it is likely that a
particular behavior may have been, or will be, misinterpreted (it is also possible that there are auditory,
olfactory, and tactile play markers; Bekoff and Byers 1981; Fagen 1981).
One action that is very common in play among canids (members of the dog family) is the ‘bow.’ Bows
occur almost exclusively in the context of social play. The ‘bow,’ a highly ritualized and stereotyped
movement that seems to function to stimulate recipients to engage (or to continue to engage) in social
play, has been extensively studied in various canids in this context. Bows (the animal crouches on her
forelimbs and elevates her hindlimbs) occur throughout play sequences, but most commonly at the
beginning or towards the middle of playful encounters. In a detailed analysis of the form and duration of
play bows (Bekoff 1977a) I discovered that duration was more variable than form, and that play bows
were always less variable when performed at the beginning, rather than in the middle of, ongoing play
sequences. Three possible explanations for this change in variability include: (1) fatigue, (2) the fact that
animals are performing them from a wide variety of preceding postures, and (3) there is less of a need to
communicate that ‘this is still play’ than there is when trying to initiate a new interaction. These
explanations are not exclusive alternatives.
In a long-term and continuing study of social play I also found that play signals in infant canids (domestic
dogs, wolves, and coyotes) were used non-randomly, especially when biting accompanied by rapid sideto-side shaking of the head was performed (Bekoff 1995). Biting accompanied by rapid side-to-side
shaking of the head is performed during serious aggressive and predatory encounters and can easily be
misinterpreted if its meaning is not modified by a play signal. Following the work of Bateson (2000);
Neuman (2003, p. 1) argues that in certain situations such as play ‘meaning is a form of coordination
between interacting agents, and that this form of coordination is orchestrated through context markers…’
He refers to this process as ‘meaning-in-context.’
Play signals are an example of what ethologists call ‘honest signals.’ There is little evidence that social
play is a manipulative or ‘Machiavellian’ activity. Play signals are rarely used to deceive others in canids
or other species. There are no studies of which I am aware that actually look at the relative frequencies of
occurrence of honest and deceptive play signaling, but my own long-term observations indicate that
deceptive signaling is so rare that I cannot remember more than a few occurrences in thousands of play
sequences. Cheaters are unlikely to be chosen as play partners because others can simply refuse to play
with them and choose others. Limited data on infant coyotes show that cheaters have difficulty getting

other young coyotes to play (personal observations). It is not known if individuals select play partners
based on what they have observed during play by others.
In domestic dogs there is little tolerance for non-cooperative cheaters. Cheaters may be avoided or
chased from play groups. There seems to be a sense of what is right, wrong, and fair. While studying dog
play on a beach in San Diego, California, Horowitz 2002) observed a dog she called Up-ears enter into a
play group and interrupt the play of two other dogs, Blackie and Roxy. Up-ears was chased out of the
group and when she returned Blackie and Roxy stopped playing and looked off toward a distant sound.
Roxy began moving in the direction of the sound and Up-ears ran off following their line of sight. Roxy
and Blackie immediately began playing once again. Even in rats fairness and trust are important in the
dynamics of playful interactions. Pellis (2002), a psychologist at the University of Lethbridge in Canada,
discovered that sequences of rat play consist of individuals assessing and monitoring one another and
then fine-tuning and changing their own behavior to maintain the play mood. When the rules of play are
violated, when fairness breaks down, so does play.
Detailed analyses show that individual actions may change their form and duration during play.
Individuals might also know that they are playing because the actions that are performed differ when they
are performed during play when compared to other contexts (Hill and Bekoff 1977), or the order in which
motor patterns are performed differs from, and might be more variable than, the order in which they are
performed during the performance of, for example, serious aggressive, predatory, or reproductive
activities (Bekoff and Byers 1981).
Individuals also engage in role-reversing and self-handicapping (Bekoff and Allen 1998; Bauer and Smuts
2002; Horowitz 2002) to maintain social play. Each can serve to reduce asymmetries between the
interacting animals and foster the reciprocity that is needed for play to occur. Self-handicapping happens
when an individual performs a behavior patterns that might compromise herself. For example, a coyote
might not bite her play partner as hard as she can, or she might not play as vigorously as she can.
Watson and Croft (1996) found that red-neck wallabies adjusted their play to the age of their partner.
When a partner was younger, the older animal adopted a defensive, flat-footed posture, and pawing
rather than sparring occurred. In addition, the older player was more tolerant of its partners tactics and
took the initiative in prolonging interactions.
Role-reversing occurs when a dominant animal performs an action during play that would not normally
occur during real aggression. For example, a dominant animal might voluntarily not roll-over on his back
during fighting, but would do so while playing. In some instances role-reversing and self-handicapping
might occur together. For example, a dominant individual might roll over while playing with a subordinate
animal and inhibit the intensity of a bite.
From a functional perspective, self-handicapping and role-reversing, similar to using specific play
invitation signals and gestures, or altering behavioral sequences, might serve to signal an individual’s
intention to continue to play. In this way there can be mutual benefits to each individual player because of
their agreeing to play and not fight or mate. This might differentiate cooperative play from the situation
described above in which a male Diana’s monkey helped a female get food when she could not learn the
task that would bring her food. There seemed to be no benefit to the male to do so. (I thank Jan Nystrom
for marking this distinction.)
Can animals forgive?
Even for the behavior of forgiving, which is often attributed solely to humans, the renowned evolutionary
biologist David Sloan Wilson (2002) shows that forgiveness is a complex biological adaptation. In his

book Darwin’s cathedral: Evolution, religion, and the nature of society, Wilson concludes that ‘…
forgiveness has a biological foundation that extends throughout the animal kingdom.’ (p. 195) And further,
‘… Forgiveness has many faces – and needs to – in order to function adaptively in so many different
contexts.’ (p. 212) While Wilson concentrates mainly on human societies his views can easily be
extended - and responsibly so - to non-human animals. Indeed, Wilson points out that adaptive traits such
as forgiveness might not require as much brain power as once thought. This is not to say that animals
aren’t smart but rather that forgiveness might be a trait that is basic to many animals even if they don’t
have especially big and active brains. Perhaps if we try to learn more about forgiveness in animals and
how it functions in play we will also learn to live more compassionately and cooperatively with one
another.
Fine-tuning play: why cooperate and play fairly?
Why do animals carefully use play signals to tell others that they really want to play and not try to
dominate them, why do they engage in self-handicapping and role-reversing? Why do they plan play?
During social play, while individuals are having fun in a relatively safe environment, they learn ground
rules that are acceptable to others – how hard they can bite, how roughly they can interact – and how to
resolve conflicts. There is a premium on playing fairly and trusting others to do so as well. There are
codes of social conduct that regulate actions that are and are not permissible, and the existence of these
codes likely speak to the evolution of social morality. What could be a better atmosphere in which to learn
social skills than during social play, where there are few penalties for transgressions? Individuals might
also generalize codes of conduct learned in playing with specific individuals to other group members and
to other situations such as sharing food, defending resources, grooming, and giving care. (Social morality
does not mean other animals are behaving unfairly when they kill for food, for example, for they have
evolved to do this.)
Playtime generally is safe time. Transgressions and mistakes are forgiven and apologies are accepted by
others especially when one player is a youngster who is not yet a competitor for social status, food, or
mates. There is a certain innocence or ingenuousness in play. Individuals must cooperate with one
another when they play – they must negotiate agreements to play (Bekoff 1995). Fagen (1993, p. 192)
noted that ‘Levels of cooperation in play of juvenile primates may exceed those predicted by simple
evolutionary arguments…’ The highly cooperative nature of play has evolved in many other species
(Fagen 1981; Bekoff 1995; Bekoff and Allen 1998; Power 2000; Drea and Frank 2003; Burghardt 2005).
Detailed studies of play in various species indicate that individuals trust others to maintain the rules of the
game (Bekoff and Byers 1998). While there have been numerous discussions of cooperative behavior in
animals (e.g. Axelrod 1984; deWaal 1996; Ridley 1996; Dugatkin 1997; Hauser 2000; essays in Journal
of Consciousness Studies, Volume 7, No. 1/2, 2000 and references therein), none has considered the
details of social play, the requirement for cooperation and reciprocity and its possible role in the evolution
of social morality, namely behaving fairly.
Individuals of different species seem to fine-tune on-going play sequences to maintain a play mood and to
prevent play from escalating into real aggression. Detailed analyses of film show that in canids there are
subtle and fleeting movements and rapid exchanges of eye contact that suggest that players are
exchanging information on the run, from moment-to-moment, to make certain everything is all right, that
this is still play. Aldis (1975) suggested that in play, there is a 50:50 rule so that each player ‘wins’ about
50% of their play bouts by adjusting their behavior to accomplish this (for further discussion and details on
rodent play, see Pellis 2002).
Why might animals fine-tune play? Why might they try hard to share one another’s intentions? While play
in most species does not take up much time and energy (Bekoff and Byers, 1998; Power 2000), and in

some species only minimal amounts of social play during short windows of time early in development are
necessary to produce socialized individuals (two 20 min play sessions with another dog, twice a week,
are sufficient for domestic dogs from 3 to 7 weeks of age (Scott and Fuller 1965)), researchers agree that
play is very important in social, cognitive, and/or physical development, and may also be important for
training youngsters for unexpected circumstances (Spinka, Newberry, and Bekoff 2001). While there are
few data concerning the actual benefits of social play in terms of survival and reproductive success, it
generally is assumed that short-term and long-terms functions (benefits) vary from species-to-species and
among different age groups and between the sexes within a species. No matter what the functions of play
may be, there seems to be little doubt that play has some benefits and that the absence of play can have
devastating effects on social development (Power 2000; Spinka, Newberry, and Bekoff 2001; Burghardt
2005).
During early development there is a small time window when individuals can play without being
responsible for their own well-being. This time period is generally referred to as the ‘socialization period’
for this is when species-typical social skills are learned most rapidly. It is important for individuals to
engage in at least some play. All individuals need to play and there is a premium for playing fairly if one is
to be able to play at all. If individuals do not play fairly they may not be able to find willing play partners. In
coyotes, for example, youngsters are hesitant to play with an individual who does not play fairly or with an
individual who they fear (Bekoff 1977b). In many species individuals also show play partner preferences
and it is possible that these preferences are based on the trust that individuals place in one another.
Fairness and fitness: coyotes, play, and dispersal
One big question of interest to biologists is how differences in the performance of a given behavior
influences an individual’s reproductive success. It is extremely difficult to show with great certainty that
the performance of a specific behavior is directly and causally coupled to reproductive success, especially
under field conditions, so in many instances we have to rely on guesswork.
With respect to the topic at hand the question is ‘Do differences in play and variations in fair play
influence an individual’s reproductive fitness?’ I am not arguing that there is a gene for social morality but
I am claiming that it is reasonable to ask if there are differences among individuals and that perhaps more
virtuous individuals are more fit and have more offspring than less virtuous individuals. A sense of
fairness is common to many animals, and without it social play would be difficult to maintain. And without
social play I and others have argued individual animals and entire groups would be at a disadvantage
(Bekoff 2002a). If I am correct, morality evolved because it is adaptive in its own right not because it is
merely an antidote to competition or aggression. Behaving fairly helps many animals, including humans,
to survive and flourish in their particular social environment. I fully realize that this may sound like a
radical idea, particularly if one views morality as uniquely human (and a sort of puzzling capacity) that
sets us apart from other animals. But if you accept my argument that play and fairness may be linked
then we need to demonstrate that individual animals might benefit from these behaviors.
Dogs, coyotes, and wolves are fast learners when it comes to fair play and I bet that other animals are as
well. There are serious sanctions when they breach the trust of their friends and these penalties might
indeed become public information if others see an individual cheating his companions. Biologists call
these penalties ‘costs,’ which means that an individual might suffer some decline in his or her
reproductive fitness if they do not play by the expected and accepted rules of the game.
My fieldwork on coyotes has revealed one direct cost paid by animals who fail to engage in fair play or
who do not play much at all. I found that coyote pups who do not play as much as others because they
are avoided by others or because they themselves avoid others are less tightly bonded to other members

of their group and more likely to strike out on their own (Bekoff 1977b). But life outside the group is much
more risky than within it. In a seven year study of coyotes living in the Grand Teton National Park outside
Moose, Wyoming, we found that more than 55% of yearlings who drifted away from their social group
died, whereas fewer than 20% of their stay-at-home peers did (Bekoff and Wells 1986). Was it because of
play? We are not sure, but information that we collected on captive coyotes suggested that the lack of
play was a major factor in individuals spending more time alone, away from their littermates and other
group members.
The evolution of fairness: a game-theoretical model
Much research on the evolution of cooperation has been modeled using game-theoretic approaches.
Dugatkin and Bekoff (2003) used a similar technique to analyze four possible strategies that an individual
could adopt over time (for species in which fairness can be expressed during two different developmental
stages), namely, being fair (F) and at a later date being fair (F/F), being fair and then not fair (F/NF), being
not fair and then fair (NF/F), and being not fair and then not fair (NF/NF). Of these, only F/F was an
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) that could evolve under the conditions of the model. None of the
other three strategies were ESSs, and when no strategy was an ESS all four could coexist. There are two
clear predictions from our results. First, always acting fairly should be more common than never acting
fairly in species in which fairness can be expressed during two different developmental stages. Second,
there should be many more cases in which none of the strategies we modeled would be an ESS, but all
four could coexist at significant frequencies. That F/NF is not an ESS is of interest because this strategy
could be conceived as a form of deceit. This finding fits in well with what is known about play signals, for
as I mentioned above, there is little evidence that play signals are used to deceive others at any stage of
development (Bekoff 1977a; Bekoff and Allen 1998). Our ideas are certainly testable in principle by
following identified individuals and recording how they distribute fairness across different activities as they
mature.
Neurobiological bases of sharing intentions and mind-reading: possible connections among
acting, seeing, feeling, and feeling/knowing
Detailed observations and descriptions are mandatory. We need to know what animals are doing when
they interact with one another in order to learn more about the neural correlates of their social activities.
This work is tedious and time-consuming.
How might a play bow (or other action) serve to provide information to its recipient about the sender’s
intentions? Is there a relationship acting, feeling, seeing, and feeling/knowing? Perhaps one’s own
experiences with play can promote learning about the intentions of others. Perhaps the recipient shares
the intentions (beliefs, desires) of the sender based on the recipient’s own prior experiences of situations
in which she performed play bows. Recent research suggests a neurobiological basis for sharing
intentions. ‘Mirror neurons,’ found in macaques, fire when a monkey executes an action and also when
the monkey observes the same action performed by another monkey (Gallese 1998; Gallese and
Goldman 1998; Motluk 2001).
Research on mirror neurons is truly exciting and the results of these efforts will be very helpful for
answering questions about which species of animals may have ‘theories of mind’ or ‘cognitive empathy’
about the mental and emotional states of others. Gallese and Goldman (1998) suggest that mirror
neurons might ‘enable an organism to detect certain mental states of observed conspecifics… as part of,
or a precursor to, a more general mindreading ability.’ Laurie Carr and her colleagues at The University of
California at Los Angeles, discovered, by using neuroimaging in humans, similar patterns of neural
activation both when an individual observed a facial expression depicting an emotion and when they

imitated the facial expression. This research suggests a neurobiological underpinning of empathy (Laurie
Carr, personal communication). Frith and Frith (1999) report the results of neural imaging studies in
humans that suggest a neural basis for one form of ‘social intelligence,’ understanding others’ mental
states (mental state attribution).
More comparative data are needed to determine if mirror neurons (or functional equivalents) are found in
other taxa and if they might actually play a role in the sharing of intentions or feelings – perhaps keys to
empathy – between individuals engaged in an on-going social interaction such as play. Neuroimaging
studies will also be especially useful.
Levels of selection
I am sure that close scrutiny of social animals will reveal more evidence that having a sense of fairness
benefits individuals. More controversially, I also believe that a moral sense benefits groups as a whole
because during social play group members learn rules of engagement that influence their decisions about
what is acceptable behavior when dealing with each other. Such an understanding is essential if
individuals are to work in harmony to create a successful group able to out compete other groups.
Following the lines of Sober and Wilson’s (1998, pp. 135ff) discussion concerning the choice of social
partners, it may be that behaving fairly is a group adaptation, but once a social norm evolves it becomes
individually advantageous to behave fairly for there are costs to not doing so (Elliott Sober, personal
communication). We still need somehow to figure out how to test rigorously ideas about levels of
selection – group selection ‘versus’ individual selection - and studies of the evolution of social morality are
good places to focus for expanding our views (e.g. Boehm 1999; Leigh 1999; see also Aviles 1999;
Bradley 1999; Gould and Lloyd 1999; Kitchen and Packer 1999; Mayr 2000).
The importance of prediction: a litmus test for knowing?
At the meeting at which this paper was presented I ended my talk making some general comments about
the notion of prediction and how the ability to make accurate predictions about what an individual is likely
to do in a given social situation may be closely linked with one’s having extensive experience with those
individuals. Of course, extensive formal (‘scientific’) experience watching animals is not necessary for
being able to make accurate predictions. Also, while I cannot know with absolute certainty that any of the
animals about whom I have written (or others) have beliefs, desires, or intentions, I also cannot know with
absolute certainty if they have a sense of ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ or if they are merely acting ‘as if’ they are moral
beings. They perform what can be called ‘moral behavior’ but it might have no bearing on what they are
thinking or feeling. However, the inescapable uncertainty associated with these claims does not mean
that I do not know quite a lot about what is happening in their minds. It seems fair to ask skeptics to do
more than say ‘as if’ is not enough’ and to assume some responsibility for studying these questions in
more rigorous ways (Bekoff 2000b).
In Species of Mind, Allen and Bekoff (1997) argued that there are a number of reasons that cognitive
explanations that entail beliefs, desires, or intentions may be the best explanations to which to appeal
because they help us come to terms with questions centering on the comparative and evolutionary study
of animal minds. First, the explanatory power of our theorizing is increased. Second, it is obvious that a
cognitive approach can generate new ideas that can be tested empirically, help in evaluations of extant
explanations, lead to the development of new predictive models, and perhaps, lead to the reconsideration
of old data, some of which might have resisted explanation without a cognitive perspective. Third,
cognitive explanations account for observed flexibility in behavior better than do less flexible stimulusresponse accounts that stipulate do ‘this’ in ‘this’ situation or ‘that’ in ‘that’ situation (Bekoff 1996). Fourth,
cognitive explanations might help scientists come to terms with larger sets of available data that are

difficult to understand. Fifth, cognitive explanations may also be more parsimonious and less
cumbersome than explanations that require numerous and diverse stimulus-response contingencies
(Bekoff 1996; Allen and Bekoff 1997; Bekoff and Allen 1997; see also (de Waal 1991).
The ability to predict what an individual is likely to do next in a social encounter might be a useful litmus
test for what is happening in that individual’s brain. This is not to say that the ability to predict on-going
behavior will ever be as accurate as, say, astronomical predictions concerning the position of stars in the
sky. Nonetheless, researchers and others who have spent much time watching individual animals are
rather good at predicting their behavior, and many of these predictions are tied in with attributions of
beliefs, desires, or intentions. This is the case for my own extensive experience of watching canids signal
their intentions to engage in and to maintain social play. Intentional or representational explanations are
important to my making accurate predictions about future behavior.
All I want to put out on the table here is the idea that the ability to predict behavior with a high degree of
accuracy might also be a good reason to favor cognitive explanations in certain situations. Accurate
prediction might be used as one measure of what a human observer ‘knows’ about the behavior of the
animals he or she is studying.
There is Wild Justice, fairness, and social cooperation: Doing what comes naturally
Justice presumes a personal concern for others. It is first of all a sense, not a rational or
social construction, and I want to argue that this sense is, in an important sense, natural.
(Solomon 1995, p. 102).
It is not difficult to imagine the emergence of justice and honor out of the practices of
cooperation. (Damasio 2003, p. 162).
More than any other species, we are beneficiaries and victims of a wealth of emotional
experience. (Dolan 2002, 1191).
Our evaluative conceptions from the nature and ideals of right-living are drawn from vast
networks of social activities that have transpired over enormous reaches of time: models
of conduct and character have been established, assayed, rejected, confirmed, revised,
redrawn, shown unfit. (Hudson 1986, p. 121).
To learn more about the evolution of cognitive capacities and morality we need to broaden our taxonomic
studies to include species other than nonhuman primates. We need to go beyond primatocentrism which
usually is ‘great ape-o-centrism’ (see also Keeley this volume). Some authors have been more resistant
to this idea than others. Consider the following claims by the Richard Byrne (1995, my emphases added)
from his book The Thinking Ape.
It seems that the great apes, especially the common chimpanzee, can attribute mental
states to other individuals; but no other group of animals can do so – apart from
ourselves, and perhaps cetaceans. (p. 146) This contrasts with the findings on
understanding of beliefs, attribution of intentions, and how things work – where a sharp
discontinuity is implied between great apes and all other animals. (p. 154)
Of course, until similar painstaking work is done with monkeys, we cannot argue that only
apes have such abilities… and no-one has yet risked the huge expenditure of time and
money to find out. (p. 172)

We simply do not have enough data to make hard and fast claims about the taxonomic distribution among
different species of the cognitive skills and emotional capacities necessary for being able to empathize
with others, to behave fairly, or to be moral agents. Marler (1996, p. 22) concluded a review of social
cognition in non-human primates and birds as follows: ‘I am driven to conclude, at least provisionally, that
there are more similarities than differences between birds and primates. Each taxon has significant
advantages that the other lacks.’ Tomasello and Call 1997, pp. 399–400) summarized their
comprehensive review of primate cognition by noting that ‘The experimental foundation for claims that
apes are ‘more intelligent’ than monkeys is not a solid one, and there are few if any naturalistic
observations that would substantiate such broad-based, species-general claims.’ While Flack and de
Waal’s (2000) and others’ focus is on non-human primates as the most likely animals to show precursors
to human morality, others have argued that we might learn as much or more about the evolution of
human social behavior by studying social carnivores (Schaller and Lowther 1969; Tinbergen 1972;
Thompson 1975; Drea and Frank 2003), species whose social behavior and organization resemble that of
early hominids in a number of ways (divisions of labor, food sharing, care of young, and inter- and
intrasexual dominance hierarchies).
What we really need are long-term field studies of social animals for which it would be reasonable to
hypothesize that emotions and morality have played a role in the evolution of sociality, that emotions and
morality are important in the development and maintenance of social bonds that allow individuals to work
together for the benefit of all group members (see also Gruen 2002).
To stimulate further comparative research (and the development of models) on a wider array of species
than has previously been studied, I offer the hypothesis that social morality, in this case behaving fairly, is
an adaptation that is shared by many mammals, not only by non-human and human primates. Behaving
fairly evolved because it helped young animals acquire social (and other) skills needed as they mature
into adults. A focus on social cooperation is needed to balance the plethora of research that is devoted to
social competition and selfishness (for further discussion see Boehm 1999; Singer 1999; Wilson 2002).
I also wonder if our view of the world would have been different had Charles Darwin been a female, if
some or many of the instances in which competition is invoked were viewed as cooperation. Women tend
to ‘see’ more cooperation in nature than do men. Adams and Burnett (1991) discovered that female
ethologists working in East Africa use a substantially different descriptive vocabulary than do male
ethologists. Of the nine variables they studied, those concerning cooperation and female gender were the
most important discriminating women’s and men’s word use. They concluded (p. 558) that ‘The variable
COOPERATION demonstrates the appropriateness of feminist claims to connection and cooperation as
women’s models for behavior, as divergent from the traditional competitive model.’ Why women and men
approach the same subject from a different perspective remains largely unanswered. Perhaps there is
more cooperation than meets the eye.
Group-living animals in which there is a variety of complex social interactions among individuals and in
which individuals assess social relationships may provide many insights into animal morality (Bekoff
2002a,b, 2003b; Drea and Frank 2003). In many social groups individuals establish social hierarchies and
develop and maintain tight social bonds that help to regulate social behavior. Individuals coordinate their
behavior – some mate, some hunt, some defend resources, some accept subordinate status – to achieve
common goals and to maintain social stability. Consider briefly, pack-living wolves, exemplars of highly
developed cooperative and coordinated behavior. Solomon (1995, pp. 139ff) also considers the
importance of learning more about wolves in his discussion of justice, emotions, and the origins of social
contracts.)

For a long time researchers thought pack size was regulated by available food resources. Wolves
typically feed on such prey as elk and moose, each of which is larger than an individual wolf. Hunting
such large ungulates successfully takes more than one wolf, so it made sense to postulate that wolf
packs evolved because of the size of wolves’ prey. Defending food might also be associated with packliving. However, long-term research by (Mech 1970) showed that pack size in wolves was regulated by
social and not food-related factors. Mech discovered that the number of wolves who could live together in
a coordinated pack was governed by the number of wolves with whom individuals could closely bond
(‘social attraction factor’) balanced against the number of individuals from whom an individual could
tolerate competition (‘social competition factor’). Codes of conduct and packs broke down when there
were too many wolves. (Colin Allen, personal communication, notes that it is possible that social factors
might be proximate influences after long periods of selection for hunting prey of a certain size favoring
packs of a certain size.) Whether or not the dissolution of packs was due to individuals behaving unfairly
is unknown, but this would be a valuable topic for future research in wolves and other social animals.
Solomon (1995, p. 143) contends that ‘A wolf who is generous can expect generosity in return. A wolf
who violates another’s ownership zone can expect to be punished, perhaps ferociously, by others.’ These
claims can easily be studied empirically. (For interesting studies of the ‘social complexity hypothesis’ that
claims ‘that animals living in large social groups should display enhanced cognitive abilities’ when
compared to those who do not, see Bond et al. (2003 p. 479) and Drea and Frank (2003).
In social groups, individuals often learn what they can and cannot do, and the group’s integrity depends
upon individuals agreeing that certain rules regulate their behavior. At any given moment individuals know
their place or role and that of other group members. As a result of lessons in social cognition and
empathy that are offered in social play, individuals learn what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ – what is acceptable to
others – the result of which is the development and maintenance of a social group that operates
efficiently. The absence of social structure and boundaries can produce gaps in morality that lead to the
dissolution of a group (Bruce Gottlieb, personal communication).
In summary, I argue that mammalian social play is a useful behavioral phenotype on which to concentrate
in order to learn more about the evolution of fairness and social morality. (While birds and individuals of
other species engage in social play, there are too few data from which to draw detailed conclusions about
the nature of their play.) There is strong selection for playing fairly because most if not all individuals
benefit from adopting this behavioral strategy (and group stability may be also be fostered). Numerous
mechanisms (play invitation signals, variations in the sequencing of actions performed during play when
compared to other contexts, self-handicapping, role-reversing) have evolved to facilitate the initiation and
maintenance of social play in numerous mammals – to keep others engaged – so that agreeing to play
fairly and the resulting benefits of doing so can be readily achieved.
Ridley (1996) points out that humans seem to be inordinately upset about unfairness, but we do not know
much about others animals reaction to unfairness. He suggests that perhaps behaving fairly pays off in
the long run. Brosnan and de Waal, (2003) have recently shown that captive brown capuchin monkeys
who were trained to exchange a token for cucumber would no longer do so when they saw another
monkey receive a grape, a more favored reward. The monkey’s response to unequal reward distribution
was interpreted as their having a sense of fairness. Dugatkin’s and my model of the development and
evolution of cooperation and fairness (Dugatkin and Bekoff 2003) suggests it might. Hauser (2000)
concluded that there is no evidence that animals can evaluate whether an act of reciprocation is fair.
However, he did not consider social play in his discussion of animal morality and moral agency. de Waal
(1996) remains skeptical about the widespread taxonomic distribution of cognitive empathy after briefly
considering social play, but he remains open to the possibility that cognitive empathy might be found in
animals other than the great apes (see Preston and de Wall 2002). It is premature to dismiss the

possibility that social play plays some role in the evolution of fairness and social morality or that animals
other than primates are unable intentionally to choose to behave fairly because they lack the necessary
cognitive skills or emotional capacities. We really have very little information that bears on these
questions.
Let me emphasize again that I am not arguing that there is a gene for fair or moral behavior. As with any
behavioral trait, the underlying genetics is bound to be complex, and environmental influences may be
large and difficult to pin down. Nonetheless, provided there is variation in levels of morality among
individuals and the trait is highly heritable, and provided virtue is rewarded by a greater number of
offspring, then genes associated with good behavior are likely to accumulate in subsequent generations.
The observation that play is rarely unfair or uncooperative is surely an indication that natural selection
acts to weed out those individuals who do not play by the rules.
Future comparative research that considers the nature and details of the social exchanges that are
needed for animals to engage in play – reciprocity and cooperation – will undoubtedly produce data that
bear on the questions that I raise in this brief essay and also help to ‘operationalize’ the notion of
behaving fairly by informing us about what sorts of evidence confirm that animals are behaving with some
sense of fairness. In the absence of this information it is premature to dismiss the possibility that social
play plays some role in the evolution of fairness and social morality or that animals other than primates
are unable intentionally to choose to behave fairly because they lack the necessary cognitive skills or
emotional capacities. These are empirical questions for which the comparative data base is scant.
Gruen (2002) also correctly points out that we still need to come to terms with what it means to be moral.
She also suggests that we need to find out what cognitive and emotional capacities operate when
humans perform various moral actions, and to study animals to determine if they share these capacities
or some variation of them. Even if it were the case that available data suggested that non-human
primates do not seem to behave in a specific way, for example, playing fairly, in the absence of
comparative data this does not justify the claim that individuals of other taxa cannot play fairly. (At a
meeting in Chicago, Illinois in August 2000 dealing with social organization and social complexity (see de
Waal and Tyack 2003), it was hinted to me that while my ideas about social morality are interesting, there
really is no way that social carnivores could be said to be so decent – to behave (play) fairly – because it
was unlikely that even non-human primates were this virtuous.)
Learning about the taxonomic distribution of animal morality involves answering numerous and often
difficult questions. Perhaps it will turn out that the best explanation for existing data in some taxa is that
some individuals do indeed on some occasions modify their behavior to play fairly.
Play may be a unique category of behavior in that asymmetries are tolerated more so than in other social
contexts. Play cannot occur if the individuals choose not to engage in the activity and the equality (or
symmetry and kindness) needed for play to continue makes it different from other forms of seemingly
cooperative behavior (e.g. hunting, care-giving). This sort of egalitarianism is thought to be a precondition
for the evolution of social morality in humans. From whence did it arise? Truth be told, we really do not
know much about the origins of egalitarianism. Arm-chair discussions, while important, will do little in
comparison to our having direct experiences with other animals. In my view, studies of the evolution of
social morality are among the most exciting and challenging projects that behavioral scientists
(ethologists, geneticists, evolutionary biologists, neurobiologists, psychologists, anthropologists),
theologians, and religious scholars face. We need to rise to the extremely challenging (and frustrating)
task before us rather than dismiss summarily and unfairly, in a speciesistic manner, the moral lives of
other animals. Fair is fair.

Morality and human nature: the precautionary principle
Just what role does human morality play in defining ‘human nature’? We do not really know despite
strong claims to the contrary. Using animal models to rationalize cruelty, divisiveness, warfare,
territoriality, and selfishness, is a disingenuous use of much available information on animal social
behavior. While animals surely can be nasty this does not explain much of the behavior that is expressed
to other individuals. I have argued that animals make choices to be nice and to be fair.
Ecologists and environmentalists have developed what they call the ‘precautionary principle’ that is used
for making decisions about environmental problems. This principle states that a lack of full scientific
certainty should not be used as an excuse to delay taking action on some issue. The precautionary
principle can be easily applied in studies of the evolution of social morality. To wit, I claim that we know
enough to warrant further comparative studies of the evolution of social morality in animals other than
non-human primates, and that until these data are available we should keep an open mind about what
individuals of other taxa can and cannot do.
It is important for us to learn more about the evolution of social morality and how this information can be
used to give us hope for the future rather than our accepting a dooms-day view of where we are all
heading ‘because it’s in our nature.’ Accepting that competition, selfishness, and cheating are what drives
human and animal behavior leaves out a lot of the puzzle of how we came to be who we are. Cooperation
and fairness can also be driving forces in the evolution of sociality.
The importance of interdisciplinary collaboration and cooperation in studies of animal cognition,
cooperation, and moral behavior cannot be emphasized too strongly. It is clear that morality and virtue did
not suddenly appear in the evolutionary epic beginning with humans. While fair play in animals may be a
rudimentary form of social morality it still could be a forerunner of more complex and more sophisticated
human moral systems. It is self-serving anthropocentric speciesism to claim that we are the only moral
beings in the animal kingdom. It is also a simplistic and misleading view to assume that humans are
merely naked apes.
The origins of virtue, egalitarianism, and morality are more ancient that our own species. Humans also
are not necessarily morally superior to other animals. But, we will never learn about animal morality if we
close the door on the possibility that it exists. It is still far too early to draw the uncompromising conclusion
that human morality is different in kind from animal morality and walk away in victory.
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